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Scientific findings based on computer simulation evoke sceptical responses because data 
generated by simulation models does not appear to have an objective status comparable with 
data captured by observation or experiment.  Counter to this, philosophers sympathetic to 
computational science, such as Winsberg (2010) and Humphreys (2004), emphasise parallels 
between experiment and simulation.  Winsberg compares the strategies of simulationists with 
those of experimenters in augmenting our “reasonable belief” in their results.  He extends to 
simulation Hacking’s notion that experimental practice is self-vindicating.  Practices such as 
parameterisation and tricks to overcome computational difficulties “carry with them their 
own credentials”. 
Lenhard & Winsberg (2010) argue that complex simulation models face epistemological 
challenges associated with a novel kind of “confirmation holism”.  Whereas Duhem argued 
that no single hypothesis can be tested in isolation, Lenhard & Winsberg claim that it is 
impossible to locate the sources of the failure of any complex simulation to match known 
data, because of three characteristics which they regard as intrinsic to the practice of complex 
systems modelling. These are identified as “fuzzy modularity”, “kludging” and “generative 
entrenchment”.  Modularity should provide a way of managing complexity; but here the 
accumulation of more and more interactive sub-models does not break down a complex 
system into separately manageable pieces, so that it must stand or fall as a whole.   
Three related issues are posed by this work: is confirmation holism essential to and 
unavoidable in complex systems modelling and/or embedded in the specific disciplinary 
practices of climate science and/or an in-principle remediable failure to observe, recognise 
and apply available and well-established sound software engineering practices when 
developing simulation software? 
Let us consider the three alleged sources of this novel confirmation holism.  “Fuzzy 
modularity” speaks for itself: the different modules simulate different parts of the climate 
2 
 
system, and these are in continual interaction, such that the behaviour of the sub-models is 
strongly influenced by the higher level models and through the higher level the sub-models 
possibly influence one another.  Thus it has proved difficult to define clean interfaces 
between the components of the model.  In some respects this problem most readily evokes 
sympathy in the critic: accepting fuzziness may be seen to enhance the realism of the overall 
model.  But as fuzzy modularity impairs the testability of the software, it can be argued that 
the price is paid in poor data reliability. 
Kludges and Generative Entrenchment are intimately interrelated.  A kludge is an inelegant, 
‘botched together’ piece of program, very complex, unprincipled in its design, ill-understood, 
hard to prove complete or sound and therefore having unknown limitations, and hard to 
maintain or extend.  Generative Entrenchment refers to the historical inheritance of hard-to-
alter features from predecessor models:  “… complex simulation models in general, and 
climate models in particular, are – due to fuzzy modularity, kludging and generative 
entrenchment – the products of their contingent respective histories … As such, climate 
models are analytically impenetrable in the sense that we have been unable, and are likely to 
continue to be unable, to attribute the various sources of their successes and failures to their 
internal modelling assumptions.” (Lenhard & Winsberg p 261) 
Now let us consider large, complex software systems from the viewpoint of Software 
Engineering Science, in which the problem of emergent “Architectural Defects” has attracted 
significant research efforts.   A software architecture captures basic design decisions which 
address qualities central to the system’s success, such as performance, reliability, security, 
maintainability and interoperation.  As many as 20% of the defects in a large system can be 
attributed to architectural decisions, and these can involve twice as much effort to correct as 
defects arising from mistakes in requirements specification or in the implementation of 
software components.  Li et al (2011) point out that architectural decisions typically affect 
multiple interacting software components, and as a result architectural defects typically span 
more than one component: they therefore concentrated on the problems of finding and 
correcting “multiple-component defects” (MCDs).  To this end, they conducted a case study 
based on the defect records of a large commercial software system which had gone through 
six releases over a period of 17 years.  Compared to single component defects they found that 
MCDs required more than 20 times as many changes to correct, and that an MCD was 6 to 8 
times more likely to persist from one release to another.  They identified “architectural 
hotspots” consisting of 20% of software components in which 80% of MCDs were 
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concentrated, and these architectural hotspots tended to persist over multiple system releases.  
This research provides an excellent example of the part played by the “Engineering Science” 
of Software Engineering in using a large corpus of data to develop a relevant body of theory 
upon which design and development practice in Software Engineering can build.  It 
exemplifies practices contrary to Humphreys’ acceptance of opacity as a sign of the 
obsolescence of human centred epistemology, or Lenhard & Winsberg’s acceptance of 
confirmation holism with respect to complex system models.   
In the practice of software engineering, defects are to be expected, because software 
development is a human activity which is error-prone, and the more complex the software 
product the more prone to defects it will be and the harder the defects will be to eliminate.  
Thus the results of simulation and computational science should never be taken “on trust”.   
Similarly, the fact that a kludge may reflect the model’s historical development is in no sense 
a credential of the model.  Kludging in the early stages of a software project creates 
“Technical Debt” on which interest will accrue in the form of error and maintenance through 
the lifecycle (Brown et al, 2010; Kruchten et al, 2012).  If a simulation is to produce data of 
sufficient quality to provide guidance for future action, whether in the sphere of engineering 
or in that of public policy, it must be calibrated using well-attested empirical data.  Absent an 
understanding of the factors that cause a simulation to diverge from past observations (or 
from empirically-grounded estimates of past trends), the predictive data produced by the 
simulation have no better standing than mere speculation.  Even where the causes of 
divergence are understood, there is no guarantee that the application of a correction factor 
will increase the reliability of the predictive outputs; indeed the opposite effect may be 
produced.    
There are growing movements to apply to software the criteria and techniques of rigour that 
have developed in other sciences, and there is at least some research to suggest that not all 
climate models are as analytically impenetrable as Lenhard & Winsberg suggest (Pipitone & 
Easterbrook, 2012).  Thus the argument from the essential epistemic opacity of computational 
science to a non-anthropocentric epistemology runs counter to best practice in software 
engineering and to empirical results of software engineering science.  In software intensive 
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